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1. CONTEXT 
The numerous reforms of the CAP in the past two decades have increased the exposure of EU 
farmers to global markets. This was the intended objective of the reforms, which aimed at 
increasing market orientation of the sector and thereby contributing to enhancing its 
competitiveness. While the gradual reduction of intervention prices fostered the convergence 
of EU prices toward world market prices, direct payments were introduced to ensure a certain 
degree of income stability for producers.  
However, the increased market orientation has also had the effect of exposing EU farmers to 
more (and occasionally excessively) volatile global agricultural markets. Excessive volatility 
of prices makes it more difficult for farmers to undertake long-term planning, particularly if 
market fundamentals are not reflected in prices, as insecure income expectations mean that 
farmers undertake less long-term investments. As a result, high uncertainty about the future 
implies that farmers' competitiveness in the long-run is compromised. Excessive income 
fluctuation also means that farmers that in normal years are competitive and efficient may be 
forced out of business due to one disastrous event, which is often outside of their control.  In 
addition to the 'traditional' sources of uncertainties, such as animal and plant health related 
risks, the effects from climate change are a growing concern for farmers as the frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events is likely to increase and changes to the seasonal variations 
in precipitation patterns take place.  
The risks inherent in farming are numerous and so different policies (animal and plant health, 
crisis management, etc.) and approaches are necessary (prevention, response, planning). This 
document focuses on ways to provide compensation for producers to aid recovery following a 
crisis. 
1.1. The current policy framework  
Current CAP instruments play a role in attenuating the risks of agricultural production 
through market measures available under the single Common Market Organisation (sCMO), 
direct payments and certain rural development programmes.  
Among market measures, intervention/reference prices provide a safety net in times of severe 
crisis for eligible sectors. When the price of a commodity eligible for intervention drops to the 
reference price level, intervention buying-in may be used to ensure a 'minimum' price level to 
producers. Private storage aid (PSA) is triggered, as a general rule, at a price level which is 
closer to market prices (above the intervention price level) and represents a first layer of 
market management. In addition, special intervention and other measures in case of market 
disturbance can be implemented at Member State or regional level under specific 
circumstances for certain sectors.1  
 
While direct payments do not have a risk management objective per se, as the payment 
ensures basic revenue for all farmers, it also ensures the inflow of capital in good years, 
                                                 
1  A more detailed overview of available market instruments under the sCMO is presented in the Annex on 
Market Measures.  
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which may be saved and used during crisis years. In bad years, it is a payment that gives the 
farmer a minimum level of income. Thus, by ensuring a basic income payment, income 
decline will be limited, because part of the farmers’ income is not affected by market 
developments and price variability. 
In addition to market measures and direct payments, the following policy tools under rural 
development can be used to provide farmers with instruments for managing production risks: 
• Globally, agricultural insurance is a widely used risk management tool. In the EU 
insurance has not been used frequently, but this trend has slowly been reversed over the 
last decade. With the Health Check in 2008 the possibility of subsidising insurance with 
EU funds was introduced. Member States may now choose to subsidise premia costs for 
farmers taking up crop, animal2 and/or plant insurance, using up to 10% of the national 
direct payment envelopes. The insurance should cover the economic losses stemming from 
the above mentioned risks. Support is provided in case of a minimum loss of 30% of the 
average annual production of the preceding three years (or Olympic average of five years). 
Support paid through Article 68 and 70 of Regulation 73/2009 is compatible with the 
WTO Green Box rules. The insurance premia is subsidised at maximum 65% of the cost 
(with the subsidy shared between the Community budget and Member States budgets). 
Farmers pay the remaining 35% of the premia cost.  
• Another way in which Member States may deal with production risks is through 
subsidising mutual funds for animal and plant diseases and environmental incidents by 
using up to 3.5% of the national direct payment envelopes. As with insurance, the mutual 
fund may compensate for the economic losses stemming from these risks. Mutual funds 
consist of contributions made by farmers, matched by public support. Support may also be 
used to pay the interest on loans taken out by the fund, if there are insufficient funds in the 
mutual fund itself. 
• The Rural Development programmes offer some further possibilities for Member States to 
help farmers deal with risks. Under Axis 1 "Improving the competitiveness of agricultural 
and forestry sector" of the Rural Development regulation (2007-2013), there are  measures 
aimed at mitigating natural disasters and climatic risks by providing support for restoring 
agricultural production potential and promoting innovation. Measures are also available for 
training farmers in risk-reduction strategies, as well as supporting diversification, which 
helps spread and hence reduce risks. These measures also include bio-security strategies 
(investment in infrastructure, advice and training) to reduce animal health risks. See Annex 
I for more details. 
State aid granted at Member State level may also contribute to addressing adverse events, as 
the possibility exists for Member States to use national funds within an authorised limit and in 
respect of the existing legal framework for state aid. Aids are allowed which compensate 
farmers for i) damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; ii) losses caused 
by adverse weather conditions; iii) prevention and combating animal and plant diseases and 
iv) insurance premia to cover production risks.  
                                                 
2  animal diseases listed by OIE and/or the relevant  EU legislation 
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A specific regulation on de minimis aid in the agricultural sector grants Member States 
flexibility to use state aids to respond to crises at regional or local level.3 This regulation 
specifies the limit of support which may be awarded to EU farms without being scrutinised 
and considered as a state aid by the Commission. This allows immediate granting of support 
to farmers. The money may be used for any purpose, subject to certain limitations.4 Some 
state aids are not compatible with the WTO Green Box rules, and are thus notified as Amber 
Box. However, it is noted that MS have sometimes used these state aids without due regard to 
prevention measures. MS sometimes pay compensation repeatedly when prevention would be 
more rational; for example in the case of production damage due to floods (weak flood 
prevention measures or production on floodplains, where it should not be the case), forest 
activities (re-afforestation after the storm, when the species diversification is insufficient, etc), 
droughts (and follow-up compensations for productivity, which is inappropriate for the land, 
etc.). MS should rather focus on prevention measures, to reduce the need to pay for 
compensation and restoration.   
Finally, market instruments are available for producers to manage their risk, such as 
agricultural derivatives markets and forward contracts. 
• Agricultural derivatives (both futures and options) markets provide a tool for producers 
and processors that facilitates price discovery and risk management. Although beneficial, 
the analytical documents accompanying the Communications on food prices and the food 
chain, which examined the issue of derivatives (among others), indicated that factors 
specific to financial markets might have amplified agricultural price changes. Accordingly, 
as outlined in the communication on 'A better functioning food supply chain in Europe', it 
is necessary to improve the overall transparency and oversight in the EU for derivatives on 
agricultural commodities – including over-the-counter (OTC) markets. In particular, a 
better overview of the activity of different types of market participants is needed. Efforts 
are currently under way to enhance he safety and efficiency of derivatives.  
• Forward contracts offer a guaranteed price to producers and lock in supply costs for 
processors and as such, remove the possibility to benefit (or lose) from future market 
developments. However, forward contracts can be used in combination with agricultural 
derivatives in order to hedge risks. 
1.1.1. Provisions for specific sectors 
The fruit and vegetable and wine sectors are dealing with perishable products and are to some 
extent different from other agricultural sectors in that the main risk for these sectors is over-
production and therefore low output prices for the products. The risk and crisis management 
instruments in place for these sectors therefore aim to prevent crises where possible and to 
manage the crisis once it has occurred. The following instruments exist for fruit and 
vegetables: market withdrawal5, green harvesting or non-harvesting, promotion and 
                                                 
3  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1535/2007 of 20 December 2007 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid in the sector of agricultural production (OJ L 3337 of 21.12.2007) 
4  The aid may not be fixed on the basis of price or quantity of products put on the market, favour domestic 
over imported products, aid to export-related activities or be granted to the undertakings in difficulty. 
5 Up to a quantitative threshold of 5% of each marketed produce, plus 5% of the total marketed volume for 
free distribution, per PO 
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communication, training measures, harvest insurance (adverse climatic events, plant diseases 
and pest infestations) and support for the administrative cost of setting up mutual funds6. 
These measures are implemented by producer organisations (POs), so they are co-financed 
50/507 by the producers and the EU. EU support is capped at 4.1% of the value of marketed 
production of the PO.8 
The current wine CMO foresees four specific intervention measures: preventive 'green 
harvesting' in the form of a flat rate payment per hectare, potable alcohol distillation in the 
form of a per-hectare aid and crisis distillation to reduce or eliminate the surplus and the use 
of concentrated grape must to increase the natural alcoholic strength. At a Community level 
only the 'green harvesting' measure will remain after July 2012. Crisis distillation will remain 
possible in justified cases, with national funds only and limited to 15 % of the respective 
value of the Member State's yearly budget for its national support programme. The wine 
CMO also foresees a by-product distillation instrument aimed at ensuring quality by avoiding 
over-pressing, while preserving the environment. 
For animal sectors, the veterinary fund covers the economic losses caused by the disposal of 
animals as well as expenses for cleaning and disinfection on farms concerned by an outbreak 
or suspicion of animal disease. The expenditure is typically co-financed 
(Commission/Members States) at 50%.9  The Action plan on the Community Animal Health 
Policy has scheduled a review of the veterinary fund for Commission adoption in 2012. At 
this stage, it is too early to anticipate which measures will be covered by the new 'Veterinary 
Fund'.  
In addition, the EU co-finances exceptional market support measures for all animal product 
sectors (meats and dairy).10 The measures allow compensation for economic losses in case of 
movement restrictions resulting from measures taken to combat the spread of animal diseases. 
Exceptional market support measures can only be taken if the Member State(s) concerned 
should request the introduction of such support measures and has quickly taken the necessary 
health and veterinary measures to stamp out the disease. EU exceptional market support 
measures can only operate to the extent and for the duration strictly necessary to support the 
market. Whenever such measures are applied the EU gives 50% co-financing.11.  Member 
States can also grant an aid financed from the state budget or through state resources for the 
                                                 
6 Article 103 c of Regulation (EC) 1234/2007 
7 40/60 in some cases 
8 EU support may be increased to 4.6% if the additional 0.5% is used for crisis prevention and management 
measures. Crisis prevention and management measures, including any repayment of capital and interest, 
shall not comprise more than one-third of the expenditure under the operational programme. In order to 
finance such measures, producer organisations may take out loans on commercial terms. In this case, the 
repayment of the capital and interest on those loans may form part of the operational programme and so 
may be eligible for Community financial assistance. Any specific action under crisis prevention and 
management shall be financed either by such loans, or directly, but not both. 
9 Managed by DG SANCO 
10 Article 44 of Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 (single CMO) is the legal basis 
11 60% for measures in case of foot-and-mouth disease 
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prevention and eradication of animal diseases under the conditions laid down in the applicable 
state aid rules.12   
Failure to prevent outbreaks of disease has serious financial consequences not only for the 
livestock sectors but also for plant production, underlining the importance of preventive 
action to stop such outbreaks from occurring in the first place. In terms of the whole food 
chain, the increased emphasis on food safety in EU law must be properly enforced and backed 
up by supporting measures including training (see Annex II on the costs of measures related 
to disease outbreaks and the benefits of preventative action).     
1.1.2. Uptake of available instruments 
With the Health Check in 2008, the Commission included a possibility of subsidising 
instruments that were directed specifically at the management of risks with the option of 
subsidising agricultural production insurances and mutual funds with a part of the direct 
payment envelope. This was a first step towards gearing the CAP in the direction of more risk 
management focus.  
Three Member States have notified their intention of using insurance subsidies in the 
framework of Article 68 for 2010 (FR, NL, IT), and one Member States (FR) has notified its 
intention to subsidise mutual funds as from 2011. The total insurance subsidies notified for 
2010 amount to 236 million euros (including co-financing), of which 177 million euros come 
from the Community budget, the rest from the national budgets.  Thirteen Member States 
have notified state aids for insurance premia subsidies since 2002. By far the biggest user is 
ES, followed by FR and PL. About 700 million euros are notified to the WTO (state aid) as 
non-product specific Amber Box subsidies for insurances.  Thus, total production insurance 
subsidies in the EU currently amount to slightly less than 1 billion euros.  
From 2011, FR will allocate 53 million euros to subsidise mutual funds, of which 
40 million euros will come from the Community budget. 
1.2. Emerging factors 
1.2.1. Increasing production uncertainties  
Climatic changes will have complex effects on the bio-physical processes that underpin 
agricultural systems, with both negative and positive consequences in different EU regions. 
Rising atmospheric CO2 concentration, higher temperatures, changes in annual and seasonal 
precipitation patterns as well as in the frequency of extreme events will affect the volume, 
quality and stability of food production and the natural environment in which agriculture 
takes place.  
Climatic variations will have consequences for the availability of water resources, soil quality 
as well as the frequency of pests and diseases, leading to significant changes in the conditions 
for crop and livestock production. In extreme cases, the degradation of agricultural 
ecosystems could lead to desertification, resulting in a total loss of the productive capacity of 
the land in question Pests and diseases adapt continuously to resistant varieties and plant 
                                                 
12 Points 131-137 of Community Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector ((2006/C 
319/01);  Regulation No 1857/2006 , in particular in Articles 10 and 16 (TSE) 
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protection products and will pose growing threats to plant resources for agriculture and 
forestry. Scientific studies show that this will be exacerbated by climate change. The financial 
case for investing in prevention of disease rather than paying for eradication is outlined in 
Annex II.  
In the short term the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and seasonal 
variations in precipitation patterns are the factors likely to have the most serious 
consequences for agriculture. Although climate change is a global process, its local impacts 
are diverse. Overall net effects on farm activities will vary across the EU and between farm 
types within the same region.  
At EU level, no correlation has been established between the warming of the last decades and 
the evolution of crop yields, which have generally increased, driven by the effects of 
technology and farm management improvements as well as the continuous adaptation of 
farming practices, so far largely outweighing the impact of climate change. However, extreme 
climatic events such as the drought and summer heat of 2003 and the spring drought of 2007 
have led to large variations in crop yields in recent years. 
While current agricultural market projections are subject to many uncertainties, including the 
impact of climate change on agricultural productivity and prices, there is a higher probability 
of an increase in extreme events that will amplify the volatility of agricultural production 
because of weather-related supply shortfalls. Even though the ultimate impacts on farm 
income depend on the interplay of many factors such as the global market and policy support, 
the higher likelihood of failures in production may lead to increasing instability in the 
economic situation of farmers affected by extreme climate events. See Annex III for a 
detailed map with observed agro-climatological changes over 1975-2007.  
1.2.2. Increasing exposure to volatile global markets  
A certain degree of price variability is a normal feature of commodity markets. However, 
price volatility in the absence of risk management instruments can be damaging for producers, 
processors, and consumers.  
Figure 1 displays price developments for representative products in the EU over 1997-2010. 
Actual increases in price volatility over most of the period on both EU and international 
markets were commodity specific, reflecting changes or expected changes in market 
fundamentals in addition to other factors. Price volatility measured in terms of coefficient of 
variation increased over the period 2004-2010 compared to 1997-2004. Although increases in 
the EU were more dramatic compared to the world markets, in absolute terms volatility 
remained higher on the world than on the EU markets during 2004 –2010.   
  9 
Figure 1: EU market prices for representative products, 1997-2010 
EU Market Prices for Representative Products
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While continuously receiving attention especially following the "food crisis" of 2007–2008, 
and an increase of price in the second half of 2010, the issue of volatility of agricultural and 
food prices is on the agenda of the G-20. In their meeting in Seoul in November 2010, the G-
20 leaders requested that Food and Agriculture Organisation, International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, United National Conference on Trade and Development, 
World Food Programme, the World Bank and World Trade Organisation work with key 
stakeholders to develop options for G20 consideration on how to better mitigate and manage 
the risks associated with the price volatility of food and other agriculture commodities 
without distorting market behavior, ultimately to protect the most vulnerable. In parallel, 
France, under their current G-20 presidency, seeks "specifically to address the issue of 
volatility in the price of agricultural commodities". Based on the report of international 
organisations, the G-20 Agriculture Ministers in Paris, on 22/23 June 2011, adopted the 
Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture. The Action Plan is divided into five 
main sections: Agriculture production and productivity, Market information and transparency, 
International Policy Coordination, Risk Management and Financial Regulation. 
Risk management instruments allow farmers to manage risk, by mitigating the impact of 
production uncertainties. By increasing stability for the agricultural sector, the instruments 
contribute to achieving the objective of maintaining agricultural production capacity 
throughout the EU, whereby there is a clear added value at EU level to support risk 
management instruments.  
The type of insurances that may be subsidised cover physical production risks. Hence, yield is 
insured against specified risks such as hail, flooding, drought, frost etc. Current specific risk 
management instruments do not cover risks related to prices.   
1.2.3. Increasing 'squeeze' on producers' margins  
The widening gap between the dynamics of producer (output) prices and costs (input prices), 
partly as a consequence of the growing linkage between agricultural and non-agricultural 
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prices, is also of concern. Figure 2 displays the recent evolution of agricultural input and 
output prices for the EU-27.  
Figure 2: Recent evolution of agricultural input and output prices for EU-2713 
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Figure 2 reveals that in the past, input costs (fertilizers, gas prices, etc.) were decreasing on 
average, albeit at a much slower rate than the decrease in output prices received by farmers. 
This widening gap between output and input prices was compensated by productivity gains.  
This trend has been exacerbated during the 2007-2008 price boom and subsequent price drop, 
with input prices increasing at a higher rate during the boom and declining at a lower rate 
during the price drop, compared to output prices. As such, the gap between the two price 
indexes has widened significantly, causing a margin 'squeeze' for farmers. 
1.3. The case for a review 
The emerging factors outlined in the previous section, as well as the large number of 
uncertainties and risks surrounding agricultural market prospects (such as the pace of 
economic recovery, future changes in the policy environment, the path of technological 
change, etc.) highlight the need for an effective risk management toolkit, beyond the existing 
(and proposed14) safety-net measures.  
While current instruments have provided solutions for risk prevention and crisis management 
alike, there is a strong case for improving the availability of such instruments and adapting 
measures to emerging factors that can increase the level of risk facing agricultural production 
and farm income.  
                                                 
13  Note that input and output prices are reflected in indexes, thus the actual prices are not comparable. 
14  See the Annex on Market Measures for details. 
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2. OBJECTIVES 
In order to help farmers develop viable risk management strategies with the objective of 
mitigating the effects of physical production risks (alongside improving farmers' awareness 
of, and encouraging compliance with, prevention and control strategies in the case of animal 
and plant diseases) and managing their income variation, the review of the policy framework 
for risk management should: 
• improve the availability of  risk management tools, especially prevention tools and those 
related to price risks, 
• adapt the modalities of the current framework to the evolving diversity of needs. 
At the same time, the measures proposed should not diminish the market orientation of the 
sector, be compatible with EU commitments in WTO and provide a cost-efficient and 
relatively stable budgetary perspective. The proposal should also ensure that risk management 
tools are used in a complementary way and in coherence with regard to other CAP 
instruments (market measures, direct payments, etc.) and without overlapping with other 
community policies (e.g. the Animal Health Strategy).  
3. OPTIONS 
3.1. Extending current framework for insurances and mutual funds  
All sectors that are currently covered would be included under this option. The scope of risks 
that would be covered by insurance would be broadened. Instead of covering merely physical 
production risks, as is the situation today, subsidies for insurance covering also economic 
risks would be possible (for example revenue insurances) or for insurance dealing with 
physical production risks not linked to a specific yield output (such as index insurance).  
In addition the technical requirements for subsidising insurance premia could be changed, for 
example by lowering the criteria: 30% loss of production and dropping the need for formal 
recognition of the occurrence of an event by the Member State (as is currently required for 
subsidies from the direct payment envelope)15.  
The requirements for subsidising mutual funds would be maintained in their current form.  
3.2. Income stabilisation tool (IST) 
The IST would compensate farmers who experience a severe income drop, compared to the 
individual's average annual income of the three preceding years (or Olympic average of the 
previous five years). Income in this case refers to total revenue received from the market 
minus input costs. The income compensation would be paid regardless of the cause of the 
income variation, be it yield variation, price fluctuation, or higher input costs. Member States 
could opt for one or more risk management tools.  
                                                 
15 This requirement is not a problem for the animal sectors as the listed diseases shall be notified by law 
anyway, it is rather a problem for the crop sector.  
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In order to meet WTO Green Box criteria, the IST would have to be open to all producers. To 
be eligible for compensation, farmers must have an income drop of at least 30%, compared to 
the average income for the preceding three years (or five year Olympic average) and a 
maximum 70% of the income drop may be compensated.  
Revenue stabilisation scheme:  
As the objective is to help farmers manage income variation, then potentially other solutions 
could be considered. An alternative to the IST could include a revenue stabilisation scheme, 
which addresses variation in revenue but which takes no account of input costs, similar to the 
American ACRE-scheme.. The EU equivalent would be an EU revenue stabilization scheme 
introduced at Member State level, which incorporates national and farm level revenue. The 
scheme would be based on a revenue guarantee (by crop) at national level, incorporating 
EU/national prices and national and farm-level yields, to take account of local conditions. The 
revenue guarantee per crop would be calculated for each year based on a moving average of 
national yields and national/EU prices. Payments would be triggered within a Member State if 
there was a shortfall in actual national average revenue compared to the national benchmark. 
A second trigger would also operate at farm level. Producers suffering an actual revenue loss 
compared to their own benchmark revenue would be eligible for a stabilization payment equal 
to the shortfall in revenue at national level, adjusted by a coefficient that takes account of the 
producer's own yield compared to the national average. Thus the scheme would offer support 
payments if revenue falls below levels seen in the recent past. Producers would be required to 
enter all crops into the scheme.   
3.3. Crisis fund  
Similar to the existing EU Solidarity Fund, this option consists of the creation of a new 
"Global Agricultural Risk Management Fund". The Fund would allow rapid financial 
assistance in case of major adverse events occurring in one or very few Member States (e.g. 
comparable to the BSE-crisis in the UK in 1996). A ceiling on the annual amount available in 
the Fund would be defined. The portion of the annual amount not entered in the budget would 
not be rolled over to the following year. It would be necessary to determine the events for 
which Member States would be authorised to call on assistance from the Fund. Any support 
under such a fund should not conflict with possible state aid measures. 
Table 1: Overview of options considered 
 Tools Changes 
Strengthening 
current tools 
Insurance subsidies, mutual funds Expanding to include revenue and 
index insurance and reducing the 
limitations for payouts 
IST Income stabilisation tool New tool 
Crisis fund Agricultural calamity fund New tool 
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4. IMPACTS 
4.1. Extending current framework for insurances and mutual funds 
4.1.1. Economic advantages and disadvantages 
A public/private partnership can help an insurance market start working through demand 
incentives, institutional arrangements and information sharing and pooling.16 The agricultural 
insurance market is bound to be very narrow without public subsidies as only few crops and 
risks can be profitably insured without any support. 
Insurance and mutual funds are tools to manage the impact of catastrophic risks and as such 
are an alternative to disaster assistance. By linking the payment of ex post ad hoc catastrophic 
aid to the uptake of insurance or mutual funds (if available), the amount paid out as disaster 
assistance may be limited. Furthermore, by imposing such conditions on disaster payments 
and by requiring producers to contribute to the scheme, farmers are encouraged to actively 
manage their own risks, before turning to government.  Less rigid requirements, for example 
lowering the 30% threshold for production losses, may create more interest among farmers to 
take up insurance. Some argue that the level of loss implied by the 30% threshold is too high 
for certain sectors.  
However, less rigid requirements may make it too advantageous for the farmer to take up 
insurances, without creating the right incentives to manage the risks at the farm. The 
difficulty with setting the "right" threshold is that it varies from sector to sector, from region 
to region and from risk to risk. By involving insurance companies in the delivery of 
agricultural support there is a risk that not all support benefits the agricultural sector, but may 
leak out through other channels.  
Mutual funds, compared to insurances, counter the risk of adverse selection or moral hazard 
behaviour.17 Subsidising mutual funds has benefits outside the scope of ensuring support to 
farmers when they experience a production problem, as it also encourages the organisation of 
producers within the food chain. They also have the possibility of compensating for 
consequential losses, something which is difficult to compensate for with insurances (because 
of the high premia cost it triggers).  
                                                 
16  OECD report, Thematic reviews on risk management: Spain, TAD/CA/APM/WP(2010)17/REV1 
17  Adverse selection: It describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance (either the propensity 
to buy insurance, or the quantity purchased, or both) is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss 
(e.g. higher risks buy more insurance), and the insurer is unable to allow for this correlation in the price of 
insurance. This may be because of private information known only to the individual (information 
asymmetry), or because of regulations or social norms which prevent the insurer from using certain 
categories of known information to set prices (e.g. the insurer may be prohibited from using information 
such as gender or ethnic origin or genetic test results). 
 Moral hazard: occurs when a party insulated from risk behaves differently than it would behave if it were 
fully exposed to the risk. In particular, moral hazard may occur if a party that is insulated from risk has 
more information about its actions and intentions than the party paying for the negative consequences of the 
risk. 
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4.1.2. WTO compliance  
Insurances 
Three changes would be introduced concerning insurance subsidies compared to status quo: 
• widening the scope to allow for the subsidisation of revenue insurance and index 
insurance (and potentially other types of insurance) 
• lower thresholds for production losses in order to be covered by insurance 
• abolishing the requirement of having a public authority declaring that a situation 
which triggers insurance payments has actually occurred  
 
In principle, this would widen the scope of the insurance schemes beyond the limits of the 
Green Box criteria; however whether actual support would be notified as Green or Amber 
Box depends on the implementation of the scheme.  
Mutual funds  
A similar approach could be followed for mutual funds. The design could allow the 
administration of different support schemes, compliant with paragraph 7 and paragraph 8 of 
Annex II of the GATT Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Even the setting up and running 
cost of the mutual fund itself could be considered to be compliant with paragraph 2 of Annex 
II of AoA, since this type of support would not involve payments to producers. All support 
that does not comply with any of these three categories would be Amber Box. 
4.1.3. Funding and budgetary implications 
Very ambitious scenario: 
If all Member States were to subsidise insurance premia and 100% of agricultural production 
was to be insured, then the total amount of support for arable crops insurance premia is not 
likely to exceed 1.6-2.3 billion euros18. The maximum amount that could be expected to be 
spent on animal insurances is 1 billion euros19. Hence, the total maximum amount that could 
be expected to be spent on insurance premia subsidies would be 2.6-3.3 billion euros.   
Moderately ambitious scenario: 
In reality it is highly unlikely that there would be 100% insurance coverage in the EU after 
the reform of the CAP. A more realistic scenario, based on past uptake of available subsidies, 
would be 40% coverage for arable crops and even more limited for animal producers. 
Following the same logic as above, the costs for subsidising arable crops premia would then 
                                                 
18 Average value of production (2006-08) for cereals/industrial/forage crops is 78 billion euros (Eurostat). 
According to JRC study on Insurances, premia cost would be around 3.5-5% of value of production. For 
100% coverage this would mean 2.7-3.9 billion in premia. If 65% of the value of the premia is subsidised 
this implies 1.6 to 2.3 billion in subsidies.  
19 Evaluation of the Community Animal Health Policy 1995-2004 and alternatives for the future. DG SANCO 
study from 2006.  
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be 0.7-1 billion euros20 and about 0.3 billion euros for the animal sector. Thus, in total the 
subsidies would amount to 1-1.3 billion euros21.  
4.1.4. Administrative burden and simplification  
This option would not add to the administrative burden, or complexity, as measures that are 
already in place in the CAP and are already controlled, could continue to be applied.  
In terms of simplification, the impact of this option for farmers is rather similar to the status 
quo option.. However farmers will initially have to familiarise themselves with the new or 
adjusted rules, which is a one-off increase in the level of administrative burden. For national 
authorities too, this option may be associated with one-off costs, requirements to modify 
national rules, possible organisational changes and time needed to become acquainted with 
the new setting. Thereafter it is expected that the level of administrative burden for both 
farmers and national authorities may reduce somewhat over time. 
4.2. Income stabilisation tool (IST) 
4.2.1. Economic advantages and disadvantages 
Subsidising insurance and putting an IST in place would substantially contribute to reducing 
farmers' income volatility. According to the OECD22, insurance indemnities reduce the 
income variance for 77% of farmers, while some form of IST23 reduces variance for 80% of 
farmers. When the two measures are combined, then reduction occurs for 87% of farmers.  
An IST is an alternative to either returning to the 'old CAP' with high intervention prices, or 
addressing concerns of income volatility with some form of Counter Cyclical Payment. Both 
solutions offer the advantage of dealing with farmers' income variation, but less effectively 
than an IST, as they influence farmers' production decisions. Therefore they are not 
compatible with WTO Green Box rules.  
However, there is a risk that by offering a very comprehensive risk management package to 
EU farmers, there would be limited incentives for the farmer to undertake on-farm strategies 
and that private initiatives, for revenue insurances in particular, could be crowded out. As the 
IST would compensate for total farm income, it may also be a disincentive to diversify 
production. The more sectors a farmer is involved in, spreading risk through diversification, 
the lower the possibility that the farmer would be compensated from the scheme, as all 
agricultural production activities would be taken into account.   
There is a risk that an IST could push farmers into taking more risky decisions. There is also a 
risk of delaying uncompetitive farmers from exiting the sector, which may slow down 
                                                 
20 Average value of production (2006-08) for cereals/industrial/forage crops is 78 billion euros (Eurostat). 
According to JRC study on Insurances, premia cost would be around 3.5-5% of value of production. For 
40% coverage this would mean 1.1-1.6 billion EUR in premia. If 65% of the value of premia is subsidised, 
this would imply 0,7 to 1 billion in subsidies. 
21 Compared to today's situation of 0.6 billion euros.  
22 OECD Report, Thematic review on Risk Management: Canada, TAD/CA/APM/WP(2010)29 
23 In this case CAIS, the previous Canadian IST, constructed much in the lines of what is being considered for 
the EU 
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structural adjustment. The scheme is designed so that  if a farmer is uncompetitive and his/her 
income is decreasing over time, then the compensation he/she receives would also decrease 
over time, since the scheme does not support income at a target level, but only compensates a 
share of the income compared to the average level of previous years. Hence, in the long-run, 
the compensation payment could be set to zero. (See Annex IV for an illustration.)  
In order for the IST to be 'fair' and functional, it would most likely be based on farmers' yearly 
income. Therefore the compensation payment for an income drop would always be paid after 
a delay compared to when the crisis actually occurred, as the income for the whole year 
would have to be taken into account, before the payment can be calculated. Hence payments 
may not reach the farmer when they are most needed.  
Revenue stabilisation scheme: an alternative to the IST 
The major advantage of the scheme is that it would offer a tool for producers to manage the 
risk of a decline in revenue that extends over a short number of years. Since benchmark 
revenue would be adjusted downwards in periods of declining revenue (as for an IST), the 
scheme would provide temporary adjustment assistance, giving producers time to respond to 
market signals.  
The main disadvantage with such a scheme, compared to an IST, is that it would not take 
account of developments in the cost of inputs. Input cost volatility is one of the major 
concerns to EU farmers and this tool would not address this challenge. Furthermore, as with 
any stabilization scheme, including an IST, the budgetary costs are unpredictable and could 
be high if prices collapsed. The scheme would not provide a safety-net floor for revenue 
because if prices remained low, then payments would eventually be phased out.  Because of 
the time lag for calculation of payments due, after the crop year, payments might not kick in 
when they would be needed most. From the producers' viewpoint, payments would not be 
directly linked to variability in farm-level revenue since they would be based on the shortfall 
calculated at national level. Hence, the compensation payment may not benefit those most in 
need.  
4.2.2. WTO compliance 
In order for the IST to meet the Green Box criteria, farmers that receive compensation must 
have an income drop of at least 30%, compared to his or her average income for the preceding 
three years (or Olympic average), and a maximum of 70% of the income drop may be 
compensated.  
The income that may be compensated is defined as 'gross income or the equivalent in net 
income terms'. The WTO has not defined the term income, so this is left to the members 
themselves.24 However, there can be no link to prices.   
                                                 
24 DG AGRI's interpretation of the wording in the GATT Agreement, Annex II, para 7, is that the income 
compensated should exclude payments from the same or similar schemes (which means that payments 
coming from other schemes that are not explicitly excluded should be considered as being covered by the 
notion of income derived from agriculture). Furthermore, "income derived from agriculture" should be seen 
as independent from any particular agricultural production as such and include all the income that a farmer 
derives from the fact of being engaged in agriculture. 
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4.2.3. Funding and budgetary implications 
Figure 3 below illustrates when the IST compensation payment would be triggered, and to 
what extent it would compensate for a drop in an individual farmer’s income. If the decline in 
income is more than 30%, then compensation may be paid. , However, the level of 
compensation can never go beyond the 30% drop, i.e. the farmer needs to find alternative 
means to cover the 30% income drop. Because the farmer's deductible is set to be at least 30% 
this avoids threshold effects and as a consequence moral hazard behaviour from farmers. This 
avoids a situation where farmers with a 29% drop do not get compensation, but in the case of 
31% drop are compensated for 70% of the income loss, which creates a moral hazard.  
The individual farmer's reference income would be adjusted downwards in periods of 
declining income, and could eventually reach zero. Thus, an IST is not a tool that guarantees a 
safety net level of revenue (as direct payments do), but rather the farmer's income 
development. (See Annex IV for an illustration of how the tool would compensate a farmer 
with declining income over time).  
Figure 3: Income compensation limited to 70% of the reference income, with different 
levels of franchise 
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An estimation of spending on an IST is shown in Figure 4. This is based on a simulation of 
what would have happened in the past, had there been an IST in place in the EU and assuming 
that  about 20% of all EU farmers would receive compensation payments each year, because 
their income drop would be more than 30% compared to their average income. Taking an 
extreme scenario, assuming that all Member States would implement an IST, and that all 
farmers would opt to participate in the scheme, the cost of compensation could amount to 
some 4-7 billion euros for the EU-25.25  
                                                 
25 EU-25 without Malta (no data). Income indicator is Gross Farm Income (total output + subsidies - taxes - 
total intermediate consumption) and the compensation formula is the one presented in figure 1. The estimate 
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Figure 4: Share of farms eligible for compensation, and compensation need over time  
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Note: Gross Farm Income used as income indicator; Average yearly compensation for EU-15 for 
1998-2007, for EU-10 (without Malta) average 2006-07  
Source: DG AGRI EU FADN 
The following graphs illustrate potential budgetary costs by Member State from implementing 
an IST, based on estimated compensation costs, had the scheme applied in the past. Figure 5 
gives an indication of the size of the envelopes that would be required in order to meet 
compensation needs. 26 The highest spending would be in Spain and Italy.  
Figure 6 shows the share of farmers in each Member State that would receive compensation 
on an average basis (again, if future compensation was to reflect historical needs), with some 
20% of all EU farmers eligible. Figure 7 shows how much compensation the average recipient 
would receive in every Member State per year, with producers in most Member States 
receiving under €10,000. 
                                                                                                                                                        
is based on DG-AGRI internal analysis, and shows what the compensation need would have been on 
average for preceding years.  
26 The compensation is calculated according to the following: [70%*(Average income year N-3 to N-1)] - 
income year N. 
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Figure 5: Level of compensation required for different Member States (in current 
Euros) 
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Note: Gross Farm Income used as income indicator; Average yearly compensation for EU-15 for 1998-2007, 
for EU-9 average 2006-07  
Source: DG AGRI L3 - EU FADN (no data for Malta, Bulgaria, Romania) 
 
Figure 6: Share of farms, per Member States, eligible for compensation with IST 
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Note: Gross Farm Income used as income indicator; Average yearly compensation for EU-15 for 1998-2007, for 
EU-9 average 2006-07  
Source: DG AGRI L3 - EU FADN (no data for Malta, Bulgaria, Romania) 
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Figure 7: Average compensation per farm, per Member States, with IST 
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Note: Gross Farm Income used as income indicator; 2007 compared to average income 2004-0627 
Source: DG AGRI L3 - EU FADN (no data for Malta, Bulgaria, Romania) 
In the future, compensation needs may be greater however, as income levels may fluctuate 
more due particularly to climate change and increasing price volatility. The estimations for 
EU-9 are likely to be underestimates, as they reflect only the year 2006-07 when direct 
payments started to be phased in and prices are on the rise since then. Hence, the share of 
farms that were eligible for compensation during this period was unusually small.  
In order to analyse potential compensation needs in the future, different scenarios were 
analysed. The objective was to assess the impact of increased price variability on the level of 
compensation payments required to compensate all farmers with an income drop of more than 
30%. The method used was a comparison of the situation in 2007 with the average in 2004-
2006, using Gross Farm Income28 as the income indicator.  
The scenarios illustrated are the following:  
- Status quo (SQ) is the situation in 2007 (compared to average 2004-06) 
- (S1) corresponds to a 30% price drop in 2007 
- (S2) corresponds to a 10% price drop in 2007 
 
Results show (see figure 8) that price fluctuations have very big impacts on the level of 
compensation required. The cost of compensating SQ would be 6.8 billion euros, whereas 
(S2) would cost 10.7 billion euros. This means that if there is an average price drop for all 
agricultural sectors of 10% and all Member States choose to apply the income stabilisation 
                                                 
27  The compensation is calculated according to the following: [70%*(Average income year N-3 to N-1)] - 
income year N. 
28  Gross Farm Income = total output + subsidies - taxes - total intermediate consumption. 
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scheme, then the compensation cost would increase by approximately 60% compared to the 
status quo. This gives an indication of how sensitive the scheme would be to price 
fluctuations.   
Figure 8: IST – compensation required for three alternative scenarios  
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Note: Gross Farm Income used as income indicator 
Source: DG AGRI L3 - EU FADN (no data for Malta, Bulgaria, Romania) 
Option S1 is an extreme example, as it is highly unlikely that the collective drop of all 
agricultural products would reach -30% in a given year. However, the other components used 
for the estimation are rather moderate in their assumptions, in that SQ and S2 are not extreme 
examples. Instead, these scenarios are based on a very restrictive compensation formula and 
income indicator. In other words, the cost of applying an IST would be highly sensitive to 
how income is defined, and to the price variation taking place. Furthermore, this cost only 
reflects the cost of the compensation itself, not the cost of administrating and/or controlling 
the scheme.  
4.2.4. Administrative burden and simplification 
Administrative burden: the proposed IST aims at compensating farmers for a substantial 
income loss. In order to determine what a substantial income loss is, detailed information 
must be collected and considerable time would be required for processing this information. 
Furthermore, the information required is not straightforward, as what is used as the income 
determinant could be very subjective. In the case of Canada (with its AgriStability scheme, 
which is a form of IST), tax declaration forms are used. However, this is not an alternative for 
the EU as a whole, as there are no common taxation rules at EU level.29  
Therefore an IST would be complex to manage and burdensome to administer. The 
complexity stems from the difficulty in finding an appropriate measure for income,  collecting 
information verifying the income indicator and  controlling the measure. Depending on how 
                                                 
29  OECD report, Thematic review on risk management: Canada; TAD/CA/APM/WP(2010)29 
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the tool would be implemented, the administrative burden would impact differently upon 
different parts of the administration chain.  
Simplification impact for farmers: in this option farmers are required to submit a substantial 
amount of information and documents when applying for support and to prove eligibility. 
Depending on the practicalities of the system this may mean that a farmer will have to spend 
considerable time collecting the information and preparing the application or, alternatively 
work with a consultant/accountant. A "light" solution would permit farmers to use already 
existing documents and information. 
Simplification impact for national authorities: this option foresees a case by case processing 
of data and judging if an applicant is eligible for support as well as deciding upon the level of 
support. The level of administrative burden to Member States is estimated to be substantial. It 
is possible that by using existing data sources and flows, as well as finding ways to automate 
the process,  the burden on national authorities may be somewhat reduced. 
4.3. Crisis fund 
4.3.1. Economic advantages and disadvantages 
Limiting government involvement to prevention and crisis tools gives incentives for farmers 
to take maximum responsibility for managing their own risks at farm level. In the event of a 
natural disaster, resources could be transferred from other rural development measures, to 
restoration measures and also preventive measures in case of an anticipated event. This would 
allow a flexible response to crises. 
The fund could be an attractive tool to address specific and extreme problems affecting one or 
a very limited number of Member States. However, it would need to be carefully designed, 
notably in terms of financing procedure in order (1) to address the concerns related to farm 
income volatility to avoid jeopardising the objective of ensuring agricultural production 
capacity throughout the EU at risk; (2) to guarantee a rapid and effective availability of funds. 
 
There could be a risk of overlapping with many measures already available in the sCMO, 
therefore its triggering mechanisms should be clearly defined and its benefits should be 
weighed against the benefits already provided by these measures. Achieving the right design 
and mechanism would allow avoiding that Member States regularly call for assistance from 
the fund (thus decreasing farmers' incentives for risk prevention). This would also enable to 
enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of ex-post ad hoc support to farmers versus ex ante 
support for preventive insurance schemes. 
A 'Global Agricultural Risk Management Fund' would ensure solidarity between Member 
States in cases of outbreaks of major adverse events. The main difficulty would be to clarify 
which criteria should be used to determine "adverse events" for which resources of the fund 
could be mobilised, in order to ensure that the Fund is applied equitably and effectively. 
4.3.2. WTO compliance 
The measures are in compliance with WTO Green Box rules, as public involvement would be 
limited to preventive and response measures and a fund for disasters.  
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4.3.3. Budgetary issues, administrative burden and simplification 
The budgetary needs of the 'Global Agricultural Risk Management Fund' would vary 
substantially between years, depending on the number and severity of events occurring.  
For national authorities: the establishment, management and control of such a Fund could 
give rise to an increase in the burden for the national authorities  as the latter are required to 
set up and maintain an infrastructure, ready to start its operations in case of urgency. Then 
when an emergency occurs, important resources are required to process demands, grant 
support as well as verifying the correct spending of the funds. 
For farmers: The level of administrative burden for farmers would be dependent on the 
occurrence of an adverse situation and if they decide to apply for support. The level of burden 
would then be determined by the modalities of the application procedure as well as the (ex-
post) control arrangements. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of economic effects and the functionalities of the tools, enhanced insurance subsidies 
and the income stabilisation tool contribute to both increasing the stability of income and 
mitigating the effects of production risks. Care should be taken however, that such tools do 
not compensate production choices which are not in line with market orientation and discard 
environmental concerns. The heterogeneity of risks and agricultural structures throughout the 
EU favours a more decentralised approach to using those instruments best suited to the 
specificities of particular regions and sectors.  Demand for risk management products depends 
on what type of agricultural production the farmer is involved in and where the farm is 
located in the EU. Rather than trying to impose a "one size fits all" solution, it is preferable to 
allow Member States flexibility in addressing risks facing farmers, so that the most 
appropriate solution may be found.  
Therefore, creation of a toolkit within the second pillar would give farmers a possibility of 
using appropriate instruments in the context of a wider strategic approach favoured in the 
Rural Development policy. The creation of an ad-hoc fund at EU level could weaken the 
development of prevention measures if it is not carefully designed and its financial procedures 
appropriately defined. 
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Annex I 
 
Risk – management related Measures in Rural Development 
On top of the fund, preventive measures would be supported, as is already the case today. 
Currently, Council Regulation (EC) 1698/2005 on support for rural development by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development provides for possibilities for farmers 
to deal with risks. Even though "risk management" is not mentioned as such in the 
Community strategic guidelines for rural development, a number of measures can be 
used for this purpose.  
a)  Measures specifically designed for the purpose of prevention and restoration 
• Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters and 
introducing appropriate prevention measures.  
The objective is to invest in preventive actions to counter the possible consequences of 
natural disasters, e.g. restoration of physical capital after floods. (The loss of income 
resulting from natural disasters is not covered). Eligible expenses can include 
investments; for example for restoration of agricultural land and soil quality; re-
establishment or restoration of dikes, drainage systems; flood prevention and 
management measures (e.g. projects related to coastal and interior flood protection). This 
measure is often linked to substantial state aids support, but the result is very often not 
achieved; prevention tools are less used than restoration tools (especially in floodplain 
areas and forests); this situation should be improved in CAP post 2013, for example by 
requiring that prevention measures are put in place at the same time as restoration 
measures.   
 
b) Other measures which include risk management / prevention-related actions 
• Knowledge Transfer and Information Actions and Use of advice and setting 
up of management, relief and advisory services 
Support could be given to actions related to training/information on risks and risk 
management for farmers. This can help improve awareness of current risks, improve risk 
management strategies and provide know how, for instance on the use of futures and 
options, which could also lead to a wider use of contracts between the food industry, 
traders, and farmers. Other operations that could be supported include   identification of 
vulnerable areas and sectors and assessment of needs and opportunities for changing 
crops and varieties in response to climate trends; building adaptive capacity by 
awareness raising and provision of salient information and advice on farm management 
and bio-security strategies to reduce animal health risks. 
• Investment in physical assets 
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Investments aimed at mitigating natural disasters and climatic risks by supporting 
restructuring and modernisation of physical assets and by promoting innovation could be 
supported, together with e.g. investments in improved efficiency of irrigation 
infrastructure and water use technologies; seeds production and storage and preventive 
mechanisms against adverse effects of climate-related extreme events (e.g. setting up of 
hail nets).  
• Business development, investments and infrastructure 
Farmers may diversify in order to reduce their production and price risk. Favourable 
results in one activity may help to offset losses in another activity. Diversification may 
include farm-related activities, but also off-farm employment (other gainful activities) 
which reduces the household’s dependency on a fluctuating income from agriculture. 
Infrastructure projects related to the development and adaptation of agriculture and 
forestry and carried out in a collective way could be supported. 
• Agri-environment payments  
Actions related to environmental services and adaptation to climate change can 
contribute to preventing risks by protecting and improving the environment in 
agricultural and forest areas. The reinforcement of the quality of management of these 
areas offers better prevention against floods, droughts, erosion, landslides, forest fires, 
storms, climate change, etc. The following operations can be taken as examples of risk 
management tools: integrated crop and pest management; conservation agriculture and 
soil management practices (e.g. no or reduced-tillage methods, catch crops, diversified 
crop rotations); water management and use, including establishment of buffer zones and 
terraces to target water erosion. 
• Animal welfare 
The measure shall contribute to encouraging farmers to provide a high standard of animal 
welfare in animal husbandry which goes beyond mandatory standards. Support can be 
provided, inter alia, for prevention of pathologies by actions improving stock 
management practices and by regular monitoring of the welfare conditions. 
• Greening of the 1st Pillar  
This will also help to ensure more resilient ecosystems, with reduced risk of problems 
from extreme events and consequently less need for remedial measures. 
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Annex II 
 
Estimated cost of measures related to outbreaks of livestock and plant diseases and 
the benefits of preventative action   
Costs of Disease outbreak is high 
In the area of Animal Health, EU measures related to outbreaks of epidemic livestock 
diseases exist which are now funded by the 'Veterinary Fund'. These include co-financing 
of veterinary emergency measures for the slaughter of animals (direct losses).  
Exceptional market support measures provide support under a different legal framework, 
to farmers/breeders affected by restrictions imposed by the veterinary authorities 
(consequential losses).  
Failure to prevent outbreaks of disease has serious financial consequences. EU 
expenditure to Member States from the emergency fund ranged from €1.7Mio in 2006 to 
€424Mio in 2002, the year after the major FMD outbreak in UK. The costs borne by 
Member States (non-EU compensated part of direct losses) differ between EU Member 
States. The total costs for the period 1997-2009 are approximately €1.1 Billion, of which 
86% are related to the major livestock diseases FMD, CSF (Classical Swine Fever) and 
Avian Influenza (AI).  
The costs of dealing with the Foot and Mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in 2001 in the EU 
are illustrative. In total some 4 million animals were culled.  The total cost of the 
outbreak in the UK was £3 billion to the public sector and £5 billion to the private sector. 
In total, the direct economic cost to the UK economy of FMD amounted to over 1% of its 
GDP. The cost for maintaining the vaccination bank at the EU level is roughly 
€1,400,000 per year. The total value for antigen stored in the vaccine bank is 
€10,600,000 from 2012 onwards. These antigens last for 5 years.30  Animal movements 
were mainly responsible for spreading the disease across the UK before it was detected. 
The same factors also led to the spread of FMD in the Netherlands and France.  
Regarding the Community Plant Health Regime (CPHR), the recent evaluation31 
demonstrates that the entry and spread in the EU of quarantine pests of plants has major 
impacts on agriculture, forestry, natural environment and landscape. The costs of future 
non-action have been estimated to be up to billions of euros annually, depending on the 
quarantine pest involved. In addition, the establishment of quarantine pests in the EU 
may result in very significant disruption in exports to third countries.  
The cost-benefit of rapid preventive action against quarantine, including the necessary 
financial EU expenditures, is illustrated by the example of Western corn rootworm 
(WCR/Diabrotica). This is the most important insect pest of maize in the world (causing 
US$1Bio losses annually in the USA) and induces the highest insecticide use in the 
                                                 
30 Anderson, Ian 2008: 'Foot and Mouth Disease 2007 - A Review and Lessons Learned', 2008 
31 Food Chain Evaluation Consortium, 2010. Evaluation of the Community plant health regime. Final report. 
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world. Up to 1992, the pest was absent from Europe. Since its introduction, it has spread 
across most of eastern and central Europe. The damage caused by this new pest for the 
EU-27 is estimated to amount to €5.6-6.3Bio over the next 25 years32. Costs associated to 
the eradication of isolated new WCR outbreaks in Member States that are WCR-free 
vary from €240.000 to €3,610.000. The WCR case shows that effective prevention of the 
entry of the quarantine pest into Europe would have been by far the most cost-effective 
measure (billions of euros savings). 
Prevention of disease is more cost-effective than cure   
The development of resilient systems in plant and animal production and along the food 
chain embraces the principle that prevention is better than cure. In animal production, the 
principle of prevention covers measures to decrease occurrence and transmission of animal 
diseases by farming and food chain practices and animal transport in order to ensure a high level 
of animal health, public health and food safety including limiting the incidence of Zoonoses in 
humans and other biological risks. It is enshrined in the Animal Health Strategy, calling for 
concrete measures to be integrated into the policy and funding framework, thus providing for 
active surveillance of bio-security and penalties and incentives for all actors along the food chain. 
The main tools and instruments of prevention are: 
• Monitoring and surveillance (Member States),  
• Bio-security measures (disinfection, segregation, cleaning) 
• Containment and eradication measures (Veterinary Fund). 
In the case of animal disease outbreak (such as FMD), possible prevention and control 
strategies include import movement restrictions legislation (in line with the OIE 
International Animal Health Code), control of animal movement across national borders, 
ban of swill feeding (leftovers of human consumption), international travel facilities 
(aircraft or ships) and containment of herds to avoid the contact with animals at risk.  At 
the same time, contingency plans should include among other elements training 
programmes for veterinarians and animal health staff (including stakeholders and 
traders), strengthening laboratory capacity for a rapid and certain diagnosis, establishing 
contact with Reference Laboratories and surveillance. 
For plant health, the principle 'prevention is better than cure' applies notably to keeping 
quarantine pests from other continents out of the EU as European plants are generally 
very susceptible to them. Worldwide, countries make considerable efforts in terms of 
legislation and financial resources to keep foreign pests out. With regard to common 
pests, healthy seeds and propagating material is critical to avoid crop losses from and 
excessive use of plant protection products. The cost-effectiveness of these measures 
covered by the EU plant reproductive material regime is high. In addition, crop rotation 
may be applied to suppress soil-borne pests. It is effective against common pests but also 
helps to prevent the establishment of some quarantine pests. However, the general 
susceptibility of European agriculture to new invading pests is to a significant degree 
dependent on the availability and use of pesticides in crop protection that create a barrier 
to invasion 
                                                 
32 Food Chain Evaluation Consortium (FCEC), 2009. Analysis of the economic, social and environmental 
impacts of options for the long-term EU strategy against Western Corn Rootworm, IA report, Annex 
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Investment in prevention is highly cost-effective for the EU at longer term. EU co-
financing for surveillance for such pests, outbreak eradication and compensation for 
losses of private operators will generate far bigger savings in the long run. An 
improvement of the plant health regime is critical for sustainable and competitive 
agriculture, mitigation of climate change and its impacts, ensuring food security and food 
safety (less use of pesticides) and for forest and landscape protection. Plant health 
problems can be damaging to important economic sectors (such as citrus or potatoes) 
causing enormous economic losses. An eradicative strategy requires almost always the 
availability of authorized pesticides with a high efficacy on the pest to be eradicated. 
Both the type of pesticide and its use may be different from normal use; Article 53 in the 
pesticide Regulation 1107/2009 provide for this need. 
In plant health, risk mitigation requires reinforced quarantine pest surveillance by 
Member States, early eradication and effective containment of quarantine pest outbreaks. 
Establishing a Plant Health Fund (like the EU animal health regime) to introduce EU co-
financing for surveillance of priority pests and for compensating losses of private 
operators as well as costs for Competent Authorities would aim at encouraging private 
operators to notify outbreaks of quarantine pests, which is essential for early action and 
eradication. 
In addition, incentives could be considered to reduce the probability of quarantine pest 
outbreaks (e.g. by crop rotation) and prevent subsequent economic and environmental 
damage. For European pests, specific farming methods (Integrated Crop Management 
ICM) could be further encouraged. 
Food safety underpins EU law         
Food safety has emerged as an important concern of EU citizens, largely due to food 
emergencies, increased consumer awareness, globalisation of food trade and a lack of 
fully harmonised implementation of food law and official controls.  These factors, allied 
to the need to support the development of the Internal Market, led the EU to overhaul its 
food law so that Member States’ food and feed law, animal health and welfare rules and 
plant health rules are now almost entirely based on EU-level legislation.   
It is necessary to apply this body of law effectively and in a harmonised way across the 
EU to ensure the same level of protection for all consumers and a level playing field for 
businesses, thereby allowing the Internal Market to function properly. Training and 
information exchange of relevant national-level control staff plays a key role in 
achieving the aim of consistent enforcement and compliance. 
As traceability along the food chain becomes more important also in a global market, the 
EU Food Law fosters the 'one step backwards – one step forwards' approach that 
requires operators to identify from whom and to whom a product has been supplied. To 
ensure that these rules do not distort integration and competitiveness of the agro-food 
sector, the Commission has launched the 'Better Training for Safer Food' initiative.   
The training is aimed primarily at Member States and third country officials involved in 
verifying compliance with EU food and feed law, animal health and welfare rules and 
plant health rules. It aims to make controls more efficient and harmonised and ensure that 
the food industry respects EU regulations safeguarding public, animal and plant health. 
This will contribute to providing safer food and feed and raising levels of consumer and 
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animal protection. Also, it provides global partners with the necessary skills and 
capacities to use EU and international standards not as barriers but as catalysts for 
development. 
The training covers such issues as: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point principles 
(HACCP); Food hygiene and controls for meat, milk and fishery products; Plant health 
controls; Veterinary and food safety control checks in border inspection posts (BIP); 
Microbiological criteria and control of zoonoses and eradication; Animal welfare at 
slaughterhouses, disease control and for religious slaughter and animal welfare during 
transport; Plant protection products; Feed law; Quality schemes;  RASFF, TRACES and 
other EU-related IT systems.  
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Increased irrigation demand
Increase of water deficit (rain-
evapotranspiration), mainly due to 
the reduction of rain during the 
growing season and partially due 
to the increase of crops water 
consumption has been simulated 
for large parts of southern Europe. 
Italy, central Spain and southern 
France presented the largest 
increases.
Reduction of winter rainfall
In Italy, Portugal, Greece, southern 
France and Ireland a significant reduction 
of cumulated values of rain during winter 
was recorded. Winter rainfall is 
particularly relevant in southern regions, 
where the majority of annual rainfall is 
concentrated in  winter time
Reduction of irrigation demand
In Balkans, Austria, Czech Republic, 
The  Netherlands, Denmark, southern 
Sweden and northern Poland a 
reduction of water deficit (rain-
evapotranspiration) was recorded, 
mainly due to the increase of rain 
during the growing season.
Lengthening of growing season
As a whole, in Europe a lengthening of growing season 
(defined as frost-free period) was observed. Even if over the 
continent the magnitude of increase varied, on average the 
lengthening is estimable in 0.8-1 day per year during the last 
30 years. However, in a few and localized areas, due to 
particular microclimatic conditions, reductions were recorded 
instead.
In general a longer growing season is related to an increased 
crop productivity and allowing for a larger number of options as
rotations and cultivable crops. 
Shortening of crop growth cycle (agrophenology)
The speed of crop development is mainly influenced by the thermal conditions. 
Therefore, increase of crops development speed did lead to a shortening of crops 
cycle over the last decades.
In general short crop cycles are related to a reduced crops productivity, especially 
if it occurs during the reproductive stages of development (grains/fruits formation).
Winter crops were influenced more than summer crops.
Increased plant heat stress
In parallel to the increase of annual mean temperatures, maximum daily values were shifted upward 
and more frequent heat stress events occurred.
Worse conditions were recorded in Spain (mainly southern areas), Italy and Black Sea area (mainly 
Turkey).
However, it must also be highlighted that locally along the Atlantic coast line and in Greece a 
reduction of frequency of heat stress was recorded
Increased winter and summer rainfall
In Scandinavia, eastern EU, Balkans and 
Austria a significant increase of 
cumulated rain both during winter and 
summer was recorded. 
Reduction of summer rainfall
Italy and southern France show a 
significant reduction of cumulated rain In 
spite of the small contribution of summer 
rain to the whole year cumulated value the 
reduced summer rain increased the water 
deficit noticeably.
Increased risk of late frosts
The frequency of late frosts has 
increased westwards of the dotted 
line bringing a greater vulnerability 
to this regions.  
AGR I4C AST – IPSC - JRC
Observed agro-climatological changes based on the MARS meteorological database 1975 - 2007
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Illustrative example, Income Stabilisation Tool, example of an individual farmer 
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